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Abstract
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) represent a zero-sum game between two machine
players, a generator and a discriminator, designed to learn the distribution of data. While GANs
have achieved state-of-the-art performance in several benchmark learning tasks, GAN minimax
optimization still poses great theoretical and empirical challenges. GANs trained using first-
order optimization methods commonly fail to converge to a stable solution where the players
cannot improve their objective, i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. Such issues
raise the question of the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in the GAN zero-sum game.
In this work, we show through several theoretical and numerical results that indeed GAN zero-
sum games may not have any local Nash equilibria. To characterize an equilibrium notion
applicable to GANs, we consider the equilibrium of a new zero-sum game with an objective
function given by a proximal operator applied to the original objective, a solution we call
the proximal equilibrium. Unlike the Nash equilibrium, the proximal equilibrium captures the
sequential nature of GANs, in which the generator moves first followed by the discriminator.
We prove that the optimal generative model in Wasserstein GAN problems provides a proximal
equilibrium. Inspired by these results, we propose a new approach, which we call proximal
training, for solving GAN problems. We discuss several numerical experiments demonstrating
the existence of proximal equilibrium solutions in GAN minimax problems.
1 Introduction
Since their introduction in [1], generative adversarial networks (GANs) have gained great success in
many tasks of learning the distribution of observed samples. Unlike the traditional approaches to
distribution learning, GANs view the learning problem as a zero-sum game between the following
two players: 1) generator G aiming to generate real-like samples from a random noise input, 2)
discriminator D trying to distinguish G’s generated samples from real training data. This game is
commonly formulated through a minimax optimization problem as follows:
min
G∈G maxD∈D V (G,D). (1.1)
Here, G and D are respectively the generator and discriminator function sets, commonly chosen as
two deep neural nets, and V (G,D) denotes the minimax objective for generator G and discriminator
D capturing how dissimilar the generated samples and training data are.
GAN optimization problems are commonly solved by alternating gradient methods, which un-
der proper regularization have resulted in state-of-the-art generative models for various benchmark
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datasets. However, GAN minimax optimization has led to several theoretical and empirical chal-
lenges in the machine learning literature. Training GANs is widely known as a challenging opti-
mization task requiring an exhaustive hyper-parameter and architecture search and demonstrating
an unstable behavior. While a few regularization schemes have achieved empirical success in train-
ing GANs [2–5], still little is known about the conditions under which GAN minimax optimization
can be successfully solved by first-order optimization methods.
To understand the minimax optimization in GANs, one needs to first answer the following
question: What is the proper notion of equilibrium in the GAN zero-sum game? In other words,
what are the optimality criteria in the GAN’s minimax optimization problem? A classical notion
of equilibrium in the game theory literature is the Nash equilibrium, a state in which no player
can raise its individual gain by choosing a different strategy. According to this definition, a Nash
equilibrium (G∗,D∗) for the GAN minimax problem (1.1) must satisfy the following for every G ∈ G
and D ∈ D:
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,D∗) ≤ V (G,D∗). (1.2)
As a well-known result, for a generator G expressive enough to reproduce the distribution of ob-
served samples, Nash equilibrium exists for the generator producing the data distribution [6].
However, such a Nash equilibrium would be of little interest from a learning perspective, since
the trained generator merely overfits the empirical distribution of training samples [7]. More im-
portantly, state-of-the-art GAN architectures [4, 5, 8, 9] commonly restrict the generator function
through various means of regularization such as batch or spectral normalization. Such regular-
ization mechanisms do not allow the generator to produce the empirical distribution of observed
data-points. Since the realizability assumption does not apply to such regularized GANs, the
existence of Nash equilibria will not be guaranteed in their minimax problems.
The above discussion motivates studying the equilibrium of GAN zero-sum games in the non-
realizable settings where the generator cannot express the empirical distribution of training data.
Here, a natural question is whether a Nash equilibrium still exists for the GAN minimax problem.
In this work, we focus on this question and demonstrate through several theoretical and numerical
results that:
Nash equilibrium may not exist in GAN zero-sum games.
We provide theoretical examples of well-known GAN formulations including the vanilla GAN [1],
Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [3], f -GAN [10], and the second-order Wasserstein GAN (W2GAN)
[11] where no local Nash equilibria exist in their minimax optimization problems. We further
perform numerical experiments on widely-used GAN architectures which suggest that an empirically
successful GAN training may converge to non-Nash equilibrium solutions.
Next, we focus on characterizing a new notion of equilibrium for GAN problems. To achieve
this goal, we consider the Nash equilibrium of a new zero-sum game where the objective function
is given by the following proximal operator applied to the minimax objective V (G,D) with respect
to a norm on discriminator functions:
V prox(G,D) ∶= max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − ∥D̃ −D∥2. (1.3)
We refer to the Nash equilibrium of the new zero-sum game as the proximal equilibrium. Given
the inherent sequential nature of GAN problems where the generator moves first followed by the
discriminator, we consider a Stackelberg game for its representation and focus on the subgame
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perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game as the right notion of equilibrium for such problems [12]. We
prove that the proximal equilibrium of Wasserstein GANs provides an SPE for the GAN problem.
This result applies to both the first-order and second-order Wasserstein GANs. In these cases, we
show a proximal equilibrium exists for the optimal generator minimizing the distance to the data
distribution.
Inspired by these theoretical results, we propose a proximal approach for training GANs, which
we call proximal training, by changing the original minimax objective to the proximal objective
in (1.3). In addition to preserving the optimal solution to the GAN minimax problem, proximal
training can further enjoy the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in the new minimax objective.
We discuss numerical results supporting the proximal training approach and the role of proximal
equilibrium solutions in various GAN problems.
2 Related Work
Understanding the minimax optimization in modern machine learning applications including GANs
has been a subject of great interest in the machine learning literature. A large body of recent
works [13–21] have analyzed the convergence properties of first-order optimization methods in
solving different classes of minimax games.
In a related work, [12] proposes a new notion of local optimality, called local minimax, designed
for general sequential machine learning games. Compared to the notion of local minimax, the
proximal equilibrium proposed in our work gives a notion of global optimality, which as we show
directly applies to Wasserstein GANs. [12] also provides examples of minimax problems where Nash
equilibria do not exist; however, the examples do not represent GAN minimax problems. Some
recent works [21–23] have analyzed the convergence of different optimization methods to local
minimax solutions.
In another related work, [24] analyzes the stable points of the gradient descent ascent (GDA)
and optimistic GDA [13] algorithms, proving that they will give strict supersets of the local saddle
points. Regarding the stability of GAN algorithms, [25] proves that the GDA algorithm will be
locally stable for the vanilla and regularized Wasserstein GAN problems. [11] shows the GDA algo-
rithm is globally stable for W2GANs with linear generator and quadratic discriminator functions.
Regarding the equilibrium in GANs, [7] studies the Nash equilibrium of GAN minimax games in
realizable settings. Also, [7,26] develop methods for finding mixed strategy Nash equilibria. On the
other hand, our results focus on the pure strategies in non-realizable settings. [27] empirically studies
the equilibrium of GAN problems regularized via the gradient penalty, reporting positive results on
the stability of regularized GANs. However, our focus is on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium
solutions. [28] suggests a moment matching GAN formulation using the Sobolev norm. As a different
direction, we use the Sobolev norm to analyze equilibrium in GANs. Finally, developing GAN
architectures with improved equilibrium and stability properties has been studied in several recent
works [2, 29–35].
3 An Initial Experiment on Equilibrium in GANs
To examine whether the Nash equilibrium exists in GAN problems empirically, we performed a
simple numerical experiment. In this experiment, we applied three standard GAN implementations
including the Wasserstein GAN with weight-clipping (WGAN-WC) [3], the improved Wasserstein
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 1: Optimizing the SN-GAN’s generator objective without changing the trained
discriminator on the MNIST and CelebA data. Both the SN-GAN objective and
samples’ quality were decreasing during the optimization.
GAN with gradient penalty (WGAN-GP) [4], and the spectrally-normalized vanilla GAN (SN-
GAN) [5], to the two benchmark MNIST [36] and CelebA [37] databases. We used the convolutional
architecture of the DC-GAN [38] optimized with the Adam [39] or RMSprop [40] (only for WGAN-
WC) optimizers.
We performed each of the GAN experiments for 200,000 generator iterations to reach (Gθfinal ,
Dwfinal) with θfinal and wfinal denoting the trained generator and discriminator parameters at the
end of the 200,000 iterations. Our goal is to examine whether the solution pair (Gθfinal ,Dwfinal)
represents a Nash equilibrium or not. To do this, we fixed the trained discriminator and kept
optimizing the generator, i.e. continuing optimizing the generator Gθ without changing the dis-
criminator Dwfinal . Here we solved the following optimization problem initialized at θ
(0) = θfinal
using the default first-order optimizer for the generator function for 10,000 iterations:
min
θ
V (Gθ,Dwfinal). (3.1)
If the pair (Gθfinal ,Dwfinal) was in fact a Nash equilibrium, it would give a local saddle point to the
minimax optimization and the above optimization could not make the objective any smaller than
its initial value. Also, the image samples generated by the generator Gθ should have improved or at
least preserved their initial quality during this optimization, since the discriminator Dwfinal would
be the optimal discriminator against all generator functions.
Despite the above predictions, we observed that none of the mentioned statements hold in
reality for any of the six experiments with the three standard GAN implementations and the two
datasets. The optimization objective decreased rapidly from the beginning of the optimization,
and the pictures sampled from the generator completely lost their quality over this optimization.
Figures 1a, 1b show the objective for the SN-GAN experiments over the 10,000 steps of the above
optimization. These figures also demonstrate the SN-GAN generated samples before and during
the optimization, which shows the significant drop in the quality of generated pictures. We defer
the results for the WGAN-WC and WGAN-GP problems to the Appendix.
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The results of the above experiments show that practical GAN experiments may not converge
to local Nash equilibrium solutions. After fixing the trained discriminator, the trained generator
can be further optimized using a first-order optimization method to reach smaller values of the
generator objective. More importantly, this optimization not only does not improve the quality of
the generator’s output samples, but also totally disturbs the trained generator. As demonstrated
in these experiments, simultaneous optimization of the two players is in fact necessary for the
proper convergence and stability behavior in GAN minimax optimization. The above experiments
suggest that practical GAN solutions are not local Nash equilibrium. In the upcoming sections, we
review some standard GAN formulations and then show that there are examples of GAN minimax
problems for which no Nash equilibrium exists. Those theoretical results will further support our
observations in the above experiments.
4 Review of GAN Formulations
4.1 Vanilla GAN & f-GAN
Consider samples x1, . . . ,xn observed independently from distribution PX. Our goal is to find a
generator function G ∈ G where G(Z) maps a random noise input Z from a known PZ to an output
G(Z) distributed as PX, i.e., we aim to match the probability distributions PG(Z) and PX. To find
such a generator function, [1] proposes the following minimax problem which is commonly referred
to as the vanilla GAN problem:
min
G∈G maxD∈D E[log(D(X))] + E[log(1 −D(G(Z)))]. (4.1)
Here G and D represent the set of generator and discriminator functions, respectively. In this
formulation, the discriminator is optimized to map real samples from PX to larger values than the
values assigned to generated samples from PG(Z).
As shown in [1], the above minimax problem for an unconstrained D containing all real-valued
functions reduces to the following divergence minimization problem:
min
G∈G JSD(PX, PG(Z)), (4.2)
where JSD denotes the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence defined in terms of KL-divergence as
JSD(P,Q) ∶= 1
2
KL(P, P +Q
2
) + 1
2
KL(Q, P +Q
2
).
f -GANs extend the vanilla GAN problem by generalizing the JS-divergence to a general f -divergence.
For a convex function f ∶ R→ R with f(1) = 0, the f -divergence df corresponding to f is defined as
df(P,Q) ∶= ∫ p(x)f(q(x)
p(x))dx. (4.3)
Notice that the JS-divergence is a special case of f -divergence with fJSD(t) = t log t− (t+ 1) log t+12 .
[10] shows that generalizing the divergence minimization (4.2) to minimizing a f -divergence results
in the following minimax problem called f -GAN:
min
G∈G maxD∈D E[D(X)] − E[f∗(D(G(Z)))], (4.4)
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where f∗ denotes the Fenchel-conjugate to f defined as f∗(u) = supt ut−f(t). The space D implied
by the f-divergence minimization will be the set of all functions, but a similar interpretation further
applies to a constrained D [41,42]. Several examples of f -GANs have been formulated and discussed
in [10].
4.2 Wasserstein GANs
To resolve GAN training issues, [3] proposes to formulate a GAN problem by minimizing the optimal
transport costs which unlike f -divergences change continuously with the input distributions. Given
a transportation cost c(x,x′) for transporting x to x′, the optimal transport cost Wc is defined as
Wc(P,Q) = inf
M∈Π(P,Q) EM [c(X,X′)] (4.5)
where Π(P,Q) denotes the set of all joint distributions on (X,X′) with X, X′ marginally dis-
tributed as P, Q, respectively. An important special case is the first-order Wasserstein distance (W1-
distance) corresponding to c(X,X′) = ∥X −X′∥. In this special case, the Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality shows
W1(P,Q) = max∥D∥Lip≤1 EP [D(X)] − EQ[D(X)]. (4.6)
Here EP [⋅] denotes the expected value with respect to distribution P and ∥D∥Lip denotes the
Lipschitz constant of function D which is defined as the smallest L satisfying ∣D(x) − D(x′)∣ ≤
L ∥x − x′∥ for every x,x′. Formulating a GAN problem minimizing the W1-distance, [3] states the
Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) problem as follows:
min
G∈G max∥D∥Lip≤1 E[D(X)] − E[D(G(Z))]. (4.7)
The above Wasserstein GAN problem can be generalized to a general optimal transport cost with
arbitrary cost function c(x,x′). The generalization is as follows:
min
G∈G maxD c-concave E[D(X)] − E[Dc(G(Z))], (4.8)
where the c-transform is defined as Dc(x) = supx′ D(x′) − c(x,x′) and a function D is called c-
concave if it is the c-transform of some valid function. In particular, the optimal transport GAN
formulation with the quadratic cost c(x,x′) = ∥x − x′∥22 results in the second-order Wasserstein
GAN (W2GAN) problem which has been studied in several recent works [11,43–45].
5 Existence of Nash Equilibrium Solutions in GANs
Consider a general GAN minimax problem (1.1) with a minimax objective V (G,D). As discussed
in the previous section, the optimal generator G∗ ∈ G is defined to minimize the GAN’s target
divergence to the data distribution. The following proposition is a well-known result regarding
the Nash equilibrium of the GAN game in realizable settings where there exists a generator G ∈ G
producing the data distribution.
Proposition 1. Assume that generator G∗ ∈ G results in the distribution of data, i.e., we have
PG∗(Z) = PX. Then, for each of the GAN problems discussed in Section 4 there exists a constant
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discriminator function Dconstant which together with G
∗ results in a Nash equilibrium to the GAN
game, and hence satisfies the following for every G ∈ G and D ∈ D:
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,Dconstant) ≤ V (G,Dconstant).
Proof. This proposition is well-known for the vanilla GAN [46]. In the Appendix, we provide a
proof for general f -GANs and Wasserstein GANs.
The above proposition shows that in a realizable setting with a generator function generating the
distribution of observed samples, a Nash equilibrium exists for that optimal generator. However,
the realizability assumption in this proposition does not always hold in real GAN experiments. For
example, in the GAN experiments discussed in Section 3, we observed that the divergence estimate
never reached the zero value because of regularizing the generator function. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium described in Proposition 1 does not apply to the trained generator and discriminator
in such GAN experiments.
Here, we address the question of the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions for non-realizable
settings, where no generator G ∈ G can produce the data distribution. Do Nash equilibria always
exist in non-realizable GAN zero-sum games? The following theorem shows that the answer is
in general no. Note that σmax(⋅) in this theorem denotes the maximum singular value, i.e., the
spectral norm.
Theorem 1. Consider a GAN minimax problem for learning a normally distributed X ∼ N (0, σ2I)
with zero mean and scalar covariance matrix where σ > 1. In the GAN formulation, we use a linear
generator function G(z) = Wz + u where the weight matrix W is spectrally-regularized to satisfy
σmax(W) ≤ 1. Suppose that the Gaussian latent vector is normally distributed as Z ∼ N (0, I) with
zero mean and identity covariance matrix. Then,
• For the f -GAN problem corresponding to an f with non-decreasing t2f ′′(t) over t ∈ (0,+∞)
and an unconstrained discriminator D where the dimensions of data X and latent Z match, the
f-GAN minimax problem has no Nash equilibrium solutions.
• For the W2GAN problem with discriminator D trained over c-concave functions, where c is the
quadratic cost, the W2GAN minimax problem has no Nash equilibrium solutions. Also, given a
quadratic discriminator D(x) = xTAx+bTx parameterized by A,b, the W2GAN problem has no
local Nash equilibria.
• For the WGAN problem with 1-dimensional X,Z and a discriminator D trained over 1-Lipschitz
functions, the WGAN minimax problem has no Nash equilibria.
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix. Note that the condition on the f -GAN holds for all
f -GAN examples in [10] including the vanilla GAN.
The above theorem shows that under the stated assumptions the GAN zero-sum game does
not have Nash equilibrium solutions. Consequently, the optimal divergence-minimizing generative
model does not result in a Nash equilibrium. In contrast to Theorem 1, the following remark shows
that the GAN zero-sum game in a non-realizable case may have Nash equilibrium solutions, of
course if Theorem 1’s assumptions do not hold.
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Remark 1. Consider the same setting as in Theorem 1. However, unlike Theorem 1 suppose that
σ < 1 and σmin(W) ≥ 1 where σmin stands for the minimum singular value. Then, for the WGAN
and W2GAN problems described in Theorem 1, the Wasserstein distance-minimizing generator
results in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
The above remark explains that the phenomenon shown in Theorem 1 does not always hold in
non-realizable GAN settings. As a result, we need other notions of equilibrium which consistently
explain optimality in GAN games.
6 Proximal Equilibrium: A Relaxation of Nash Equilibrium
To define a proper notion of equilibrium for GANs, note that due to the sequential nature of GAN
games the equilibrium notion should be flexible to allow to some extent the optimization of the
discriminator around the equilibrium solution. This property is in fact consistent with the stability
feature observed for the first-order GAN training methods where the alternating first-order method
stabilizes around a certain solution. To this end, we consider the following objective for a GAN
problem with minimax objective V (G,D):
V proxλ (G,D) ∶= max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ2 ∥D̃ −D∥2. (6.1)
The above definition represents the application of a proximal operator to V (G,D), which further
optimizes the original objective in the proximity of discriminator D. To keep the D̃ function variable
close to D, we penalize the distance among the two functions in the proximal optimization. Here
the distance is measured using a norm ∥ ⋅ ∥ on the discriminator function space.
To extend the notion of Nash equilibrium to general minimax problems, we propose considering
the Nash equilibria of the defined V proxλ (G,D).
Definition 1. We call (G∗,D∗) a λ-proximal equilibrium for V (G,D) if it represents a Nash
equilibrium for V proxλ (G,D) , i.e. for every G ∈ G and D ∈ D
V proxλ (G∗,D) ≤ V proxλ (G∗,D∗) ≤ V proxλ (G,D∗). (6.2)
The next proposition provides necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the original ob-
jective V (G,D) for the proximal equilibrium solutions.
Proposition 2. (G∗,D∗) is a λ-proximal equilibrium if and only if for every G ∈ G and D ∈ D we
have
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,D∗) ≤ max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ2 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2
Therefore, if (G∗,D∗) is a λ-proximal equilibrium it will give a global minimax solution, i.e., G∗ ∈ G
minimizes the worst-case objective, maxD∈D V (G,D), with D∗ being its optimal solution.
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
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The following result shows the proximal equilibria provide a hierarchy of equilibrium solutions
for different λ values.
Proposition 3. Define PEλ(V ) to be the set of the λ-proximal equilibria for V (G,D). Then, if
λ1 ≤ λ2,
PEλ2(V ) ⊆ PEλ1(V ). (6.3)
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
Note that as λ approaches infinity, V proxλ (G,D) tends to the original V (G,D), implying that
PEλ=+∞(V ) is the set of V (G,D)’s Nash equilibria. In contrast, for λ = 0 the proximal objective
becomes the worst-case objective maxD∈D V (G,D). As a result, PEλ=0(V ) is the set of global
minimax solutions described in Proposition 2.
Concerning the proximal optimization problem in (6.1), the following proposition shows that if
the original minimax objective is a smooth function of the discriminator parameters, the proximal
optimization can be solved efficiently and therefore one can efficiently compute the gradient of the
proximal objective.
Proposition 4. Consider the maximization problem in the definition of proximal objective (6.1)
where generator Gθ and discriminator Dw are parameterized by vectors θ, w, respectively. Suppose
that
• For the considered discriminator norm ∥ ⋅∥, ∥Dw−D∥2 is η1-strongly convex in w for any function
D, i.e. for any w,w′,D:
∥∇w∥Dw −D∥2 − ∇w∥Dw′ −D∥2∥2 ≥ η1∥w −w′∥2,
• For every Gθ, The GAN minimax objective V (Gθ,Dw) is η2-smooth in w, i.e. i.e. for any
w,w′,θ: ∥∇wV (Gθ,Dw) − ∇wV (Gθ,Dw′)∥2 ≤ η2∥w −w′∥2.
Under the above assumptions, if η2 < λη12 , the maximization objective in (6.1) is λη12 − η2-strongly
concave. Then, the maximization problem has a unique solution w∗ and if V (Gθ,Dw) is differen-
tiable with respect to θ we have
∇θV proxλ (Gθ,Dw) = ∇θV (Gθ,Dw∗). (6.4)
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
The above proposition suggests that under the mentioned assumptions, one can efficiently com-
pute the optimal solution to the proximal maximization through a first-order optimization method.
The assumptions require the smoothness of the GAN minimax objective with respect to the dis-
criminator parameters, which can be imposed by applying norm-based regularization tools to neural
network discriminators.
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7 Proximal Equilibrium in Wasserstein GANs
As shown earlier, GAN minimax games may not have any Nash equilibria in non-realizable set-
tings. As a result, we seek for a different notion of equilibrium which remains applicable to GAN
problems. Here, we show the proposed proximal equilibrium provides such an equilibrium notion
for Wasserstein GAN problems.
To define a proper proximal operator for defining proximal equilibria in Wasserstein GAN
problems, we use the second-order Sobolev semi-norm averaged over the underlying distribution of
data. Given the underlying distribution PX, we define the Sobolev semi-norm as
∥D∥
H˙1
∶= √EPX [∥∇xD(X)∥22 ] . (7.1)
The above semi-norm is induced by the following semi-inner product and therefore leads to a
semi-Hilbert space of functions:
⟨D1,D2⟩H˙1 ∶= EPX [∇D1(X)T∇D2(X) ] . (7.2)
Throughout our discussion, we consider a parameterized set of generators G = {Gθ ∶ θ ∈ Θ}.
For a GAN minimax objective V (G,D), we define Dθ to be the optimal discriminator function for
the parameterized generator Gθ:
Dθ ∶= argmax
D∈D V (Gθ,D). (7.3)
The following theorem shows that the Wasserstein distance-minimizing generator function in the
second-order Wasserstein GAN problem satisfies the conditions of a proximal equilibrium based on
the Sobolev semi-norm defined in (7.1).
Theorem 2. Consider the second-order Wasserstein GAN problem (4.8) with a quadratic cost
c(x,x′) = η2∥x−x′∥22. Suppose that the set of optimal discriminators {Dθ ∶ θ ∈ Θ} is convex. Then,(Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) for the Wasserstein distance-minimizing generator Gθ∗ ∈ G will provide a 1η -proximal
equilibrium with respect to the Sobolev norm in (7.1).
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
The above theorem shows that while, as demonstrated in Theorem 1, the W2GAN problem may
have no local Nash equilibrium solutions, the proximal equilibrium exists for the W2GAN problem
and holds at the Wasserstein-distance minimizing generator Gθ∗ . The next theorem extends this
result to the first-order Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) problem.
Theorem 3. Consider the WGAN problem (4.7) minimizing the first-order Wasserstein distance.
For each Gθ, define αθ ∶ Rd → R≥0 to be the magnitude of the resulted optimal transport map from
X to Gθ(Z), i.e. X − α2θ(X)∇Dθ(X) shares the same distribution with Gθ(Z).1 Given these
definitions, assume that
• {αθ(⋅)∇Dθ(⋅) ∶ θ ∈ Θ} is a convex set,
• for every x and θ, η2 ≤ α2θ(x) holds for constant η.
1Note that as shown in the proof such a mapping αθ exists under mild regularity assumptions.
10
Then, (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) for the Wasserstein distance-minimizing generator function Gθ∗ provides an η-
proximal equilibrium with respect to the Sobolev norm in (7.1).
Proof. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
The above theorem shows that if the magnitude of optimal transport map is everywhere lower-
bounded by λ2 , then the Wasserstein distance-minimizing generator in the WGAN problem yields
a λ-proximal equilibrium.
8 Proximal Training
As shown for Wasserstein GAN problems, given the defined Sobolev norm and a small enough λ
the proximal objective V proxλ (G,D) will possess a Nash equilibrium solution. This result motivates
performing the minimax optimization for the proximal objective V proxλ (G,D) instead of the orig-
inal objective V (G,D). Therefore, we propose proximal training in which we solve the following
minimax optimization problem:
min
Gθ∈G maxDw∈D V proxλ (Gθ,Dw), (8.1)
with the proximal operator defined according to the Sobolev norm in (7.1).
In order to take the gradient of V proxλ (Gθ,Dw) with respect to θ, Proposition 4 suggests solving
the proximal optimization followed by computing the gradient of the original objective V (Gθ,Dw∗)
where the discriminator is parameterized with the optimal solution w∗ to the proximal optimization.
Algorithm 1 GAN Proximal Training
Input: data xi, size n
Initialize the parameters w(0),θ(0)
for k = 0 to MAX ITER do≫ Update w(k+1) = argmax
w
V (Gθ(k) ,Dw) − λ2n ∑ni=1 ∥∇xDw(xi) −∇xDw(k)(xi)∥22.
≫ Update θ(k+1) = θ(k) − γk∇θV (Gθ(k) ,Dw(k+1)).
end for
Algorithm 1 summarizes the main two steps of proximal training. At every iteration, the
discriminator is optimized with an additive Sobolev norm penalty forcing the discriminator to
remain in the proximity of the current discriminator. Next, the generator is optimized using
a gradient descent method with the gradient evaluated at the optimal discriminator solving the
proximal optimization. The stepsize parameter γk can be adaptively selected at every iteration k.
In practice, we can solve the proximal maximization problem via a first-order optimization method
for a certain number of iterations. Assuming the conditions of Proposition 4 hold, the proximal
optimization leads to the maximization of a strongly-concave objective which can be solved linearly
fast through first-order optimization methods.
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 2: Optimizing the proximal objective over the generator with a fixed discrimi-
nator on MNIST and CelebA datasets. The SN-GAN’s objective and samples’ quality
were preserved during the optimization.
9 Numerical Experiments
To experiment the theoretical results of this work, we performed several experiments using the [4]’s
implementation of Wasserstein GANs with the code available at the paper’s Github repository.
In addition, we used the implementations of [5, 47] for applying spectral regularization to the
discriminator network. In the experiments, we used the DC-GAN 4-layer CNN architecture for
both the discriminator and generator functions [38] and ran each experiment for 200,000 generator
iterations with 5 discriminator updates per generator update. We used the RMSprop optimzier [40]
for WGAN experiments with weight clipping or spectral normalization and the Adam optimizer [39]
for the other experiments.
9.1 Proximal Equilibrium in Wasserstein and Lipschitz GANs
We examined whether the solutions found by Wasserstein and Lipschitz vanilla GANs represent
proximal equilibria. Toward this goal, we performed similar experiments to Section 3’s experiments
for the WGAN-WC [3], WGAN-GP [4], and SN-GAN [5] problems over the MNIST and CelebA
datasets. In Section 3, we observed that after fixing the trained discriminator Dwfinal the GAN’s
minimax objective V (Gθ,Dwfinal) kept decreasing when we optimized only the generator Gθ. In
the new experiments, we similarly fixed the trained discriminator Dwfinalresulted from the 200,000
training iterations, but instead of optimizing the GAN minimax objective we optimized the proximal
objective defined by the norm (7.1) with λ = 0.1. Thus, we solved the following optimization problem
initialized at θfinal which denotes the parameters of the trained generator:
min
θ
V proxλ=0.1(Gθ,Dwfinal). (9.1)
We computed the gradient of the above proximal objective by applying the Adam optimizer for 50
steps to approximate the solution to the proximal optimization (6.1) which at every iteration was
initialized at wfinal. Figures 2a and 2b show that in the SN-GAN experiments the original minimax
objective had only minor changes, compared to the results in Section 3, and the quality of generated
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Table 1: Inception scores for ordinary vs. proximal training
GAN Problem Ordinary Proximal
WGAN-WC (DIM=64) 4.16 ± 0.15 4.56 ± 0.19
WGAN-WC (DIM=128) 2.52 ± 0.12 4.23 ± 0.15
SN-GAN (DIM=64) 5.12 ± 0.25 5.72 ± 0.22
SN-GAN (DIM=128) 5.62 ± 0.23 6.12 ± 0.22
samples did not change significantly during the optimization. We defer the similar numerical results
of the WGAN-WC and WGAN-GP experiments to the Appendix. These numerical results suggest
that while Wasserstein and Lipschitz GANs may not converge to local Nash equilibrium solutions
as shown in Section 3, their found solutions can still represent a local proximal equilibrium.
9.2 Proximal Training Improves Lipschitz GANs
We applied the proximal training in Algorithm 1 to the WGAN-WC and SN-GAN problems. To
compute the gradient of the proximal minimax objective, we solved the maximization problem in
the Algorithm 1’s first step in the for loop by applying 20 steps of Adam optimization initialized at
the discriminator parameters at that iteration. Applying the proximal training to MNIST, CIFAR-
10, and CelebA datasets, we qualitatively observed slightly visually better generated pictures. We
postpone the generated samples to the Appendix.
To quantitatively compare the proximal and ordinary non-proximal GAN training, we measured
the Inception scores of the samples generated in the CIFAR-10 experiments. As shown in Table
1, proximal training results in an improved inception score. In this table, DIM stands for the
dimension parameter of the DC-GAN’s CNN networks.
References
[1] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil
Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in
neural information processing systems, pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[2] Tim Salimans, Ian Goodfellow, Wojciech Zaremba, Vicki Cheung, Alec Radford, and Xi Chen.
Improved techniques for training gans. In Advances in neural information processing systems,
pages 2234–2242, 2016.
[3] Martin Arjovsky, Soumith Chintala, and Le´on Bottou. Wasserstein gan. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1701.07875, 2017.
[4] Ishaan Gulrajani, Faruk Ahmed, Martin Arjovsky, Vincent Dumoulin, and Aaron C Courville.
Improved training of wasserstein gans. In Advances in neural information processing systems,
pages 5767–5777, 2017.
[5] Takeru Miyato, Toshiki Kataoka, Masanori Koyama, and Yuichi Yoshida. Spectral normaliza-
tion for generative adversarial networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05957, 2018.
13
[6] Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville. Deep learning, volume 1. MIT Press,
2016.
[7] Sanjeev Arora, Rong Ge, Yingyu Liang, Tengyu Ma, and Yi Zhang. Generalization and
equilibrium in generative adversarial nets (gans). In Proceedings of the 34th International
Conference on Machine Learning-Volume 70, pages 224–232, 2017.
[8] Han Zhang, Ian Goodfellow, Dimitris Metaxas, and Augustus Odena. Self-attention generative
adversarial networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.08318, 2018.
[9] Andrew Brock, Jeff Donahue, and Karen Simonyan. Large scale gan training for high fidelity
natural image synthesis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.11096, 2018.
[10] Sebastian Nowozin, Botond Cseke, and Ryota Tomioka. f-gan: Training generative neural sam-
plers using variational divergence minimization. In Advances in neural information processing
systems, pages 271–279, 2016.
[11] Soheil Feizi, Farzan Farnia, Tony Ginart, and David Tse. Understanding gans: the lqg setting.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.10793, 2017.
[12] Chi Jin, Praneeth Netrapalli, and Michael I Jordan. Minmax optimization: Stable limit points
of gradient descent ascent are locally optimal. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.00618, 2019.
[13] Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Haoyang Zeng. Training gans
with optimism. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.00141, 2017.
[14] Maher Nouiehed, Maziar Sanjabi, Tianjian Huang, Jason D Lee, and Meisam Razaviyayn.
Solving a class of non-convex min-max games using iterative first order methods. In Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 14905–14916, 2019.
[15] Aryan Mokhtari, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Sarath Pattathil. A unified analysis of extra-gradient
and optimistic gradient methods for saddle point problems: Proximal point approach. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1901.08511, 2019.
[16] Kiran K Thekumparampil, Prateek Jain, Praneeth Netrapalli, and Sewoong Oh. Efficient
algorithms for smooth minimax optimization. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 12659–12670, 2019.
[17] Kaiqing Zhang, Zhuoran Yang, and Tamer Basar. Policy optimization provably converges
to nash equilibria in zero-sum linear quadratic games. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 11598–11610, 2019.
[18] Eric V Mazumdar, Michael I Jordan, and S Shankar Sastry. On finding local nash equilibria
(and only local nash equilibria) in zero-sum games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.00838, 2019.
[19] Tanner Fiez, Benjamin Chasnov, and Lillian J Ratliff. Convergence of learning dynamics in
stackelberg games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.01217, 2019.
[20] Yisen Wang, Xingjun Ma, James Bailey, Jinfeng Yi, Bowen Zhou, and Quanquan Gu. On the
convergence and robustness of adversarial training. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, pages 6586–6595, 2019.
14
[21] Tianyi Lin, Chi Jin, and Michael I Jordan. On gradient descent ascent for nonconvex-concave
minimax problems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.00331, 2019.
[22] Qi Lei, Jason D Lee, Alexandros G Dimakis, and Constantinos Daskalakis. Sgd learns one-layer
networks in wgans. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.07030, 2019.
[23] Yuanhao Wang, Guodong Zhang, and Jimmy Ba. On solving minimax optimization locally:
A follow-the-ridge approach. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2020.
[24] Constantinos Daskalakis and Ioannis Panageas. The limit points of (optimistic) gradient de-
scent in min-max optimization. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
9236–9246, 2018.
[25] Vaishnavh Nagarajan and J Zico Kolter. Gradient descent gan optimization is locally stable.
In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 5585–5595, 2017.
[26] Ya-Ping Hsieh, Chen Liu, and Volkan Cevher. Finding mixed nash equilibria of generative
adversarial networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.02002, 2018.
[27] William Fedus, Mihaela Rosca, Balaji Lakshminarayanan, Andrew M Dai, Shakir Mohamed,
and Ian Goodfellow. Many paths to equilibrium: Gans do not need to decrease a divergence
at every step. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.08446, 2017.
[28] Youssef Mroueh, Chun-Liang Li, Tom Sercu, Anant Raj, and Yu Cheng. Sobolev gan. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.04894, 2017.
[29] David Berthelot, Thomas Schumm, and Luke Metz. Began: Boundary equilibrium generative
adversarial networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.10717, 2017.
[30] Martin Heusel, Hubert Ramsauer, Thomas Unterthiner, Bernhard Nessler, and Sepp Hochre-
iter. Gans trained by a two time-scale update rule converge to a local nash equilibrium. In
Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 6626–6637, 2017.
[31] Lars Mescheder, Sebastian Nowozin, and Andreas Geiger. The numerics of gans. In Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 1825–1835, 2017.
[32] Kevin Roth, Aurelien Lucchi, Sebastian Nowozin, and Thomas Hofmann. Stabilizing training
of generative adversarial networks through regularization. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, pages 2018–2028, 2017.
[33] Naveen Kodali, Jacob Abernethy, James Hays, and Zsolt Kira. On convergence and stability
of gans. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07215, 2017.
[34] Lars Mescheder, Andreas Geiger, and Sebastian Nowozin. Which training methods for gans
do actually converge? arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.04406, 2018.
[35] Zhiming Zhou, Jiadong Liang, Yuxuan Song, Lantao Yu, Hongwei Wang, Weinan Zhang, Yong
Yu, and Zhihua Zhang. Lipschitz generative adversarial nets. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.05687,
2019.
15
[36] Yann LeCun. The mnist database of handwritten digits. http://yann. lecun. com/exdb/mnist/,
1998.
[37] Ziwei Liu, Ping Luo, Xiaogang Wang, and Xiaoou Tang. Deep learning face attributes in
the wild. In Proceedings of International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), December
2015.
[38] Alec Radford, Luke Metz, and Soumith Chintala. Unsupervised representation learning with
deep convolutional generative adversarial networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.06434, 2015.
[39] Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[40] Geoffrey Hinton, Nitish Srivastava, and Kevin Swersky. Neural networks for machine learning
lecture 6a overview of mini-batch gradient descent. 14(8), 2012.
[41] Shuang Liu, Olivier Bousquet, and Kamalika Chaudhuri. Approximation and convergence
properties of generative adversarial learning. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 5545–5553, 2017.
[42] Farzan Farnia and David Tse. A convex duality framework for gans. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pages 5248–5258, 2018.
[43] Tim Salimans, Han Zhang, Alec Radford, and Dimitris Metaxas. Improving gans using optimal
transport. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.05573, 2018.
[44] Maziar Sanjabi, Jimmy Ba, Meisam Razaviyayn, and Jason D Lee. On the convergence and
robustness of training gans with regularized optimal transport. In Advances in Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems, pages 7091–7101, 2018.
[45] Amirhossein Taghvaei and Amin Jalali. 2-wasserstein approximation via restricted convex
potentials with application to improved training for gans. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.07197,
2019.
[46] Ian Goodfellow. Nips 2016 tutorial: Generative adversarial networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1701.00160, 2016.
[47] Farzan Farnia, Jesse Zhang, and David Tse. Generalizable adversarial training via spectral
normalization. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2019.
[48] Stephen Boyd and Lieven Vandenberghe. Convex optimization. Cambridge university press,
2004.
[49] Ce´dric Villani. Optimal transport: old and new, volume 338. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2008.
[50] Dimitri P Bertsekas. Nonlinear programming. Journal of the Operational Research Society,
48(3):334–334, 1997.
[51] Luigi Ambrosio and Nicola Gigli. A users guide to optimal transport. In Modelling and
optimisation of flows on networks, pages 1–155. Springer, 2013.
16
(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 3: Optimizing the trained generator of WGAN-WC with a fixed discriminator
on the MNIST and CelebA data. The GAN’s objective and samples’ quality were
decreasing over the optimization.
Appendix A Numerical Results for Section 3
Here, we provide the complete numerical results for the experiments discussed in Section 3 of
the main text. Regarding the plots shown in Section 3 for the SN-GAN implementation, here
we present the same plots for the Wasserstein GAN with weight clipping (WGAN-WC) and with
gradient penalty (WGAN-GP) problems. Figures 3a-4b repeat the experiments of Figures 1,2 in the
main text for the WGAN-WC and WGAN-GP problems. These plots suggest that a similar result
also holds for the WGAN-WC and WGAN-GP problems, where the objective and the generated
samples’ quality were decreasing during the generator optimization. For a larger set of generated
samples in the main text’s Figures 1,2 and Figures 3a-4b, we refer the readers to Figures 5a-7b.
Appendix B Numerical Results for Section 9
Here, we present the complete numerical results for the experiments of Section 9 in the main
text. Figures 8a-9b demonstrate the results of the main text’s Figures 3,4 for the WGAN-WC
and WGAN-GP problems. Here, except the WGAN-GP experiment on the CelebA dataset, we
observed that the objective and the generated samples’ quality did not significantly decrease over
the generator optimization. Even for the WGAN-GP experiment on the CelebA data, we observed
that the objective value decreased three times less than in minimizing the original objective rather
than the proximal objective. These experiments suggest that the Wasserstein and Lipschitz GAN
problems can converge to local proximal equilibrium solutions. We also show a larger group of
generated samples at the beginning and final iterations of Figures 3,4 in the main text and Figures
8a-9b in Figures 10a-12b.
For the proximal training experiments, Figures 13-15b show the samples generated by the SN-
GAN and WGAN-WC proximally trained on CIFAR-10 and CelebA data with the results for the
baseline regular training on the top of the figure and the results for proximal training on the
bottom. We observed a somewhat improved quality achieved by proximal training, which was
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 4: Optimizing the trained generator of WGAN-GP with a fixed discriminator
on the MNIST and CelebA data. The GAN’s objective and samples’ quality were
decreasing over the optimization.
further supported by the inception scores for the CIFAR-10 experiments reported in the main text.
Appendix C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof for f-GANs:
Consider the following f -GAN minimax problem corresponding to the convex function f :
min
G∈G maxD E[D(X)] − E[f∗(D(G(Z)))]. (C.1)
Due to the realizability assumption, given G∗ ∈ G we assume that the data distribution and the
generative model are identical, i.e., PX = PG∗(Z). Then, the minimax objective for G∗ reduces to
EPX[D(X) − f∗(D(X)) ]. (C.2)
The above objective decouples across X outcomes. As a result, the maximizing discriminator
D∗(x) = f ′(1) will be a constant function where the constant value f ′(1) follows from the opti-
mization problem:
f ′(1) = argmax
u∈R u − f∗(u). (C.3)
Note that the objective u − f∗(u) is a concave function of u whose derivative is zero at f∗′−1(1) =
f ′(1), because the Fenchel-conjugate of a convex f satisfies f∗′−1 = f ′.
So far we have proved that the constant function Dconstant(x) = f ′(1) provides the optimal
discriminator for generator G∗. Therefore, for every discriminator D we have
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,Dconstant), (C.4)
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 5: SN-GAN’s generated samples at the iterations marked in Figures 1a & 1b
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 6: WGAN-WC’s generated samples at the iterations marked in Figures 3a &
3b
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 7: WGAN-GP’s generated samples at the iterations marked in Figures 4a & 4b
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 8: Optimizing the proximal objective for the trained generator in WGAN-WC
with a fixed discriminator on data. The GAN’s objective and samples’ quality were
preserved over the optimization.
where V (G,D) denotes the f -GAN’s minimax objective. Moreover, note that for a constant D the
value of the minimax objective does not change with generator G. As a result, for every G
V (G,Dconstant) = V (G∗,Dconstant). (C.5)
Then, (C.4) and (C.5) collectively prove that for every G and D we have
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,Dconstant) ≤ V (G,Dconstant),
which completes the proof for f -GANs.
Proof for Wasserstein GANs:
Consider a general Wasserstein GAN problem with a cost function c satisfying c(x,x) = 0 for
every x. Notice that this property holds for all Wasserstein distance measures corresponding to
cost function ∥x−x′∥q for q ≥ 1. The generalized Wasserstein GAN minimax problem is as follows:
min
G∈G maxDc-concave E[D(X)] − E[Dc(G(Z))]. (C.6)
Due to the realizability assumption, a generator function G∗ ∈ G results in the data distribution
such that PG∗(Z) = PX. Then, the above minimax objective for G∗ reduces to
EPX[D(X) −Dc(X) ]. (C.7)
Since the cost is assumed to take a zero value given identical inputs, we have:
Dc(x) ∶ = max
x′ D(x′) − c(x,x′)≥D(x) − c(x,x)=D(x).
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 9: Optimizing the proximal objective for the trained generator in WGAN-GP
with a fixed discriminator on data. The GAN’s objective and samples’ quality were
preserved over the optimization.
As a result, D(x) −Dc(x) ≤ 0 holds for every x. Hence, the objective in (C.7) will be non-positive
and takes its maximum zero value for any constant function Dconstant, which by definition satisfies
c-concavity. Therefore, letting V (G,D) denote the GAN minimax objective, for every D we have
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,Dconstant). (C.8)
We also know that for a constant discriminator Dconstant the value of the minimax objective is
independent from the generator function. Therefore, for every G we have
V (G∗,Dconstant) = V (G,Dconstant). (C.9)
As a result, (C.8) and (C.9) together show that for every G and D
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,Dconstant) ≤ V (G,Dconstant), (C.10)
which makes the proof complete for Wasserstein GANs.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 1 & Remark 1
Proof for f-GANs:
Lemma 1. Consider two random vectors X, X̃ with probability density functions p, q, respectively.
Suppose that p, q are non-zero everywhere. Then, considering the following variational representa-
tion of df(P,Q),
df(P,Q) = max
D
E[D(X)] − E[f∗(D(X̃))], (C.11)
the optimal solution D∗ will satisfy
D∗(x) = f ′(p(x)
q(x)). (C.12)
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 10: SN-GAN’s generated samples at the first and last iterations of Figures 2a,2b
Proof. Let us rewrite the f -divergence’s variational representation as
df(P,Q) = max
D
E[D(X)] − E[f∗(D(X̃))]
= max
D
∫ [p(x)D(x) − q(x)f∗(D(x))]dx
= ∫ max
D(x)[p(x)D(x) − q(x)f∗(D(x))]dx
where the last equality holds, since the maximization objective decouples across x values. It can
be seen that the inside optimization problem for each D(x) is maximizing a concave objective in
which by setting the derivative to zero we obtain
f∗′(D∗(x)) = p(x)
q(x) . (C.13)
As a property of the Fenchel-conjugate of a convex f , we know f∗′−1 = f ′ which combined with the
above equation implies that
D∗(x) = f ′(p(x)
q(x)). (C.14)
The above result completes Lemma 1’s proof.
Consider the f -GAN problem with the generator function specified in the theorem:
min
W,u∶ ∥W∥2≤1 maxD E[D(X)] − E[f∗(D(WZ + u))]. (C.15)
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 11: WGAN-WC’s generated samples at the first and last iterations of Figures
8a,8b
Note that X ∼ N (0, σ2I) and WZ + u ∼ N (u,WWT ). Notice that if W was not full-rank, the
maximized discriminator objective would be +∞ achieved by a D assigning an infinity value to the
points not included in the rank-constrained support set of generator Wz + u. This will not result
in a solution to the f -GAN problem, because we assume that the dimensions of X and Z match
each other and hence there exists a full-rank W with a finite maximized objective, i.e. f -divergence
value. Therefore, in a Nash equilibrium of the f -GAN problem, the solution W must be full-rank
and invertible.
Lemma 1 results in the following equation for the optimal discriminator D∗W,u given generator
parameters W,u:
D∗W,u(x) = f ′( 1√(2piσ2)k exp{ − 12σ2 ∥x∥
2
2
}
1√(2pi)k det(WWT ) exp{ − 12∥(WWT )−1/2(x − u)∥22})
= f ′(√det(WWT )
σ2k
exp{1
2
xT ((WWT )−1 − σ−2I)x − uT (WWT )−1/2x + uT (WWT )−1u}).
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(a) Results on the MNIST data (b) Results on the CelebA data
Figure 12: WGAN-GP’s generated samples at the first and last iterations of Figures
9a,9b
As a result, the function f∗(D∗W,u(⋅)) appearing in the f -GAN’s minimax objective will be
f∗(D∗W,u(x)) = f∗(f ′(√det(WWT )σ2k exp{12xT ((WTW)−1
−σ−2I)x − uT (WWT )−1/2x + uT (WWT )−1u})).
Claim: f∗(D∗W,u(x)) is a strictly convex function of x.
To show this claim, note that the following expression is a strongly-convex quadratic function
of x, since we have assumed that the spectral norm of W is bounded as σmax(W) ≤ 1 < σ:
1
2
xT ((WTW)−1 − σ−2I)x − uT (WTW)−1/2xuT (WTW)−1u.
For simplicity, we denote the above strongly-convex function with g(x) and define the function
h ∶ R→ R as
h(y) ∶= f∗(f ′(√det(WWT )
σ2k
× ey)).
According to the above definitions, f∗(D∗W,u(x)) = h(g(x)) is the composition of h and strongly-
convex g. Note that h is a monotonically increasing function, since defining c = √det(WWT )
σ2k
> 0 we
have
h′(y) = (c ey)2 f ′′(c ey) ≥ 0, (C.16)
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Figure 13: The images generated by the SN-GAN (DIM=128) trained on CIFAR-10
data with (top) ordinary and (bottom) proximal training.
which follows from the equality
f∗(f ′(z)) ∶= sup
u
{uf ′(z) − f(u)} = zf ′(z) − f(z)
that is a consequence of the definition of Fenchel-conjugate, implying that
df∗(f ′(z))
dz = zf ′′(z) for
the convex f . Note that h′(y) > 0 holds everywhere, because f is assumed to be strictly convex.
This proves that h is strictly increasing. Furthermore, h is a convex function, because h′(y) is
non-decreasing due to the assumption that t2f ′′(t) is non-decreasing over t ∈ (0,+∞). As a result,
h is an increasing convex function.
Therefore, f∗(D∗W,u(x)) = h(g(x)) is a composition of a strongly-convex g and an increasing
convex h ∶ R → R. Therefore, as a well-known result in convex optimization [48], the claim is true
and f∗(D∗W,u(x)) is a strictly convex function of x.
We showed that the claim is true for every feasible W,u. Now, we prove that the pair(GW,u,D∗W,u) will not be a local Nash equilibrium for any feasible W,u. If the pair (GW,u,D∗W,u)
was a local Nash equilibrium, W,u would be a local minimum for the following minimax objective
where D∗ is fixed to be D∗W,u:
E[D∗(X)] − E[f∗(D∗(WZ + u))]. (C.17)
However, as shown earlier, for any feasible W,u, f∗(D∗(x)) is a strictly-convex function of x,
which in turn shows that (C.17) is a strictly-concave function of variable u. This consequence
proves that the objective has no local minima for the unconstrained variable u. Due to the shown
contradiction, a pair with the form (GW,u,D∗W,u) cannot be a local Nash equilibrium in parameters
W,u. Consequently, the minimax problem has no pure Nash equilibrium solutions, since in a pure
Nash equilibrium the discriminator will be by definition optimal against the choice of generator.
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(a) WGAN-WC with DCGAN-DIM=64 (b) WGAN-WC with DCGAN-DIM=128
Figure 14: The images generated by the WGAN-WC trained on CIFAR-10 data with
(top) ordinary and (bottom) proximal training.
Proof for W2GANs:
Consider the W2GAN problem with the assumed generator function:
min
W,u∶ ∥W∥2≤1 maxDc-concave E[D(X)] − E[Dc(WZ + u)], (C.18)
where the c-transform is defined for the quadratic cost function c(x,x′) = 12∥x−x′∥22. Similar to the
f -GAN case, define D∗W,u to be the optimal discriminator for the generator function parameterized
by W,u. Note that X ∼ N (0, σ2I) and WZ + u ∼ N (u,WWT ).
According to the Brenier’s theorem [49], the optimal transport from the Gaussian data distri-
bution to the Gaussian generative model will be
ψopt(x) = x −∇xD∗W,u(x).2
As a well-known result regarding the second-order optimal transport map between two Gaussian
distributions, the optimal transport will be a linear transformation as ψopt(x) = 1σ (WWT )1/2x+u.
This result shows that ∇xD∗W,u(x) = (I − 1σ (WWT )1/2)x − u. (C.19)
Note that the c-transform for cost c(x,x′) = 12∥x − x′∥22 satisfies Dc(x) = (12∥x∥2 −D(x))∗ − 12∥x∥2
where g∗ denotes g’s Fenchel-conjugate. For general convex quadratic function g(x) = 12xTAx+bTx
we have g∗(x) = 12(x−b)TA†(x−b) where A† denotes A’s Moore Penrose pseudoinverse. Therefore,
2Notice the change of variable D(x) = 1
2
∥x∥2−ψ(x) compared to the formulation discussed at [11,49] which are based
on the function ψ.
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(a) The results for SN-GAN (b) The results for WGAN-WC
Figure 15: The images generated by the GAN trained on CelebA data with (top)
ordinary and (bottom) proximal training.
for the c-transform of the optimal discriminator we will have∇xD∗cW,u(x) = (σ((WWT )1/2)† − I)x − σ((WWT )1/2)†u.
Since every feasible W satisfies the bounded spectral norm condition as σmax(W) ≤ 1 < σ, the
optimal D∗cW,u will be a quadratic function whose Hessian has at least one strictly positive eigenvalue
along the principal eigenvector of WWT . The positive eigenvalue exists in general case where Z’s
dimension can be even smaller than X’s dimension. If we had the stronger assumption that the two
dimensions exactly match, similar to the f-GAN problem considered, then the pseudo-inverse A†
would be the same as the inverse A−1 resulting in a strongly-convex quadratic D∗cW,u. Nevertheless,
as we prove here, the theorem’s result on W2GAN holds in the general case and does not necessarily
require the same dimension between X and Z.
Consider the W2GAN minimax objective for the pair (GW,u,D∗) where D∗ is fixed to be the
optimal D∗W,u:
E[D(X)] − E[D∗c(WZ + u)], (C.20)
If (GW,u,D∗W,u) was a local Nash equilibrium, the variables W,u would provide a local minimum
to the above objective. However, since D∗cW,u is shown to be a quadratic function with a Hessian
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possessing positive eigenvalues, the above minimax objective will not have a local minimum in the
unconstrained variable u. Therefore, the minimax problem possesses no local Nash equilibrium
solutions with the form (GW,u,D∗W,u) and therefore no pure Nash equilibrium solutions.
For the parameterized case with a quadratic discriminator DA,b(x) = xTAx + bTx, first of all
note that as shown in the proof the optimal discriminator D∗W,u for any generator parameter W,u
will be a c-concave quadratic function. Therefore, the optimal solution for the discriminator does
not change because of the new quadratic constraint. Furthermore, the discriminator optimization
problem has a concave objective in parameters A,b. This is because the discriminator DA,b(x) is
a linear function in terms of A,b, and DcA,b(x) = supx′DA,b(x′) − c(x′,x) is a convex function of
A,b as the supremum of some affine functions is convex.
As a result, the discriminator optimization reduces to maximizing a concave objective of A,b
constrained to a convex set {A ∶ I − A ≽ 0} which is equivalent to the c-concave constraint on
the quadratic DA,b. Hence, any local solution to this optimization problem will also be a global
solution. This result implies that any local Nash equilibrium for the new parameterized minimax
problem will have the form (GW,u,D∗W,u), which as we have already shown does not exist under
the theorem’s assumptions.
Proof for the 1-dimensional WGAN:
Consider the 1-dimensional Wasserstein GAN problem for the assumed linear generator function:
min
w,u∶ ∣w∣≤1 max∥D∥Lip≤1 E[D(X)] − E[D(wZ + u)]. (C.21)
The inner maximization problem can be rewritten as
max∥D∥Lip≤1 ∫ (pX(x) − pwZ+u(x))D(x)dx. (C.22)
Here we have
pX(x) − pwZ+u(x) = 1√
2piσ2
exp{ −1
2σ2
x2} − 1√
2piw2
exp{ −1
2w2
(x − u)2}
Since ∣w∣ ≤ 1 < σ, it can be seen that the above difference will be positive everywhere except over
an interval (a1, a2), where a1, a2 are the two solutions to the quadratic equation:
( 1
w2
− 1
σ2
)x2 − 2 u
w2
x + ( u2
w2
− log( σ∣w∣ )) = 0. (C.23)
Note that the above quadratic equation has two distinct solutions a1 < a2, since ∣w∣ < σ and
log( σ∣w∣) > 0 leading to the positive discriminant:
4
u2
w2σ2
+ 4 log( σ∣w∣ )( 1w2 − 1σ2 ) > 0. (C.24)
As the function D in the maximization problem (C.22) is only constrained to be 1-Lipschitz, the
optimal D∗w,u’s slope must be equal to −1 over (−∞, a1] and equal to +1 over [a2,∞), in order to
allow the maximum increase in the maximization objective. Over the interval (a1, a2), we claim
that for the optimal D is a convex function, because otherwise its double Fenchel-conjugate D∗∗,
which is by definition convex, achieves a higher value.
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First of all, note that the double Fenchel-conjugate D∗∗ will not be different from D outside the(a1, a2) interval, because D∗∗ is defined to provide the largest convex function satisfying D∗∗ ≤D,
and D is supposed to be 1-Lipschitz taking its minimum derivative on (∞, a1] and its maximum
derivative over [a2,∞). Next, since D∗∗ lower-bounds D, it results in a non-smaller integral value
over the interval (a1, a2) as pX(x)−pwZ+u(x) takes negative values over (a1, a2). If D is not convex,
then D∗∗ provides a strict lower-bound for D which matches D over (∞, a1] ∪ [a2,∞). Therefore,
the convex 1-Lipschitz D∗∗ results in a greater objective that is a contradiction to D’s optimality.
This contradiction proves that the optimal discriminator D∗w,u is a convex function.
Therefore, for every feasible ∣w∣ ≤ 1, there exists an optimal solution D∗w,u for (C.22) that is
a non-constant convex function. This result proves that the WGAN problem has no local Nash
equilibiria with the form (Gw,u,D∗w,u), because if (Gw,u,D∗w,u) was a local Nash equilibrium then
w,u would be a local minimum for the following objective where D∗ is fixed to be D∗w,u:
E[D∗(X)] − E[D∗(wZ + u)]. (C.25)
However, the above objective is a non-constant concave function of the unconstrained variable u
and hence does not have a local minimum in u. This shows that the WGAN problem does not have
a Nash equilibrium and completes the proof for the WGAN case.
Remark. Consider the same setting as in Theorem 1. However, unlike Theorem 1 suppose that
σ < 1 and σmin(W) ≥ 1 where σmin stands for the minimum singular value. Then, for the WGAN
and W2GAN problems described in Theorem 1, the Wasserstein distance-minimizing generator
results in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Proof for the W2GAN:
For the W2GAN case, note that if we repeat the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1, we
can show
∇xD∗cW,u(x) = (σ(WWT )−1/2 − I)x − σ(WWT )−1/2u.
which is a concave quadratic function of x, since the assumptions imply that (WWT )−1 ≼ σ−2I.
Here W is supposed to be a full-rank square matrix as its minimum singular value is assumed to
be positive and Z has the same dimension as X.
We claim that for the feasible choice W∗ = I and u∗ = 0, the pair (GW∗,u∗ ,D∗W∗,u∗) results in a
Nash equilibrium of the minimax problem. Considering the definition of the optimal discriminator
D∗W∗,u∗ , its optimlaity for GW∗,u∗ directly follows. Moreover, (??) implies that
D∗cW∗,u∗(x) = σ − 12 ∥x∥22. (C.26)
As a result, fixing the above discriminator function the minimax objective will be
E[D∗(X)] − E[ σ − 1
2
∥WZ + u∥22]
= E[D∗(X)] + 1 − σ
2
(∥W∥2F + ∥u∥22)
which is minimized at W = I and u = 0 over the specified feasible set, as we know the Frobenius
norm-squared, ∥W∥2F , is the sum of the squared of W’s singular values. Therefore, the claim holds
and the choice W∗ = I and u∗ = 0 results in the optimal solution and a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof for the 1-dimensional Wasserstein GAN:
Here we select the parameters w∗ = 1, u∗ = 0. We claim that the optimal discriminator function
for this choice is the negative absolute value function D∗(x) = −∣x∣. Note that the optimal 1-
Lipschitz D∗ solves the following problem:
max∥D∥Lip≤1 ∫ ( 1√2piσ2 e− x22σ2 − 1√2pie−x22 )D(x)dx. (C.27)
In the above objective given η = √2σ2 log(1/σ)
1−σ2 , the function 1√2piσ2 e− x
2
2σ2 − 1√
2pi
e−x22 is positive over(−η, η) and negative elsewhere. Therefore, the optimal D∗ should get the maximum +1 derivative
over (−∞,−η] and the minimum −1 derivative over [+η,+∞). Because of the even structure of
1√
2piσ2
e− x22σ2 − 1√
2pi
e−x22 , there exists an even optimal D∗ because D∗(x)+D∗(−x)2 remains 1-Lipschitz
and optimal for any optimal 1-Lipschitz discriminator D∗. The optimal even D∗ should further
be continuous as a 1-Lipschitz function, implying that such a D∗ is decreasing over (0, η] and
increasing over [−η,0). Enforcing the maximum derivative over the two interval results in the
optimal D∗(x) = −∣x∣.
Therefore, D∗(x) = −∣x∣ provides an optimal discriminator for w∗ = 1, u∗ = 0. Also, for this D∗
the minimax objective of the Wasserstein GAN will be
E[−∣X ∣] − E[−∣wZ + u∣] = −E[∣X ∣] + E[∣wZ + u∣]
In the above equation, wZ + u ∼ N (u,w2), showing that the above objective is minimized at
w∗ = 1, u = 0 considering the assumed feasible set where ∣w∣ ≥ 1. As a result, the pair (Gw∗,u∗ ,D∗)
provides a Nash equilibrium to the WGAN minimax game.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of the ⇒ direction:
Assume that (G∗,D∗) is a λ-proximal equilibrium. According to the definition of the proximal
equilibrium, the following holds for every G ∈ G and D ∈ D:
V proxλ (G∗,D) ≤ V proxλ (G∗,D∗) ≤ V proxλ (G,D∗). (C.28)
Claim: V proxλ (G∗,D∗) = V (G∗,D∗).
To show this claim, note that
V proxλ (G∗,D∗) ∶= max
D̃∈D V (G∗, D̃) − λ2 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2. (C.29)
In this optimization, the optimal solution D˜ is D∗ itself. Otherwise, for the optimal D˜ ∈ D we have∥D̃ −D∗∥ > 0 and as a result
V proxλ (G∗,D∗) < V (G∗, D˜) ≤ V proxλ (G∗, D˜), (C.30)
which is a contradiction given that (G∗,D∗) is a λ-proximal equilibrium. Therefore, D∗ optimizes
the proximal optimization, which shows the claim is valid and we have V proxλ (G∗,D∗) = V G∗,D∗).
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Knowing that V (G,D) ≤ V proxλ (G,D) holds for every G ∈ G,D ∈ D, we have
V (G∗,D) ≤ V proxλ (G∗,D)≤ V proxλ (G∗,D∗)= V (G∗,D∗).
Furthermore,
V (G∗,D∗) = V proxλ (G∗,D∗) (C.31)≤ V proxλ (G,D∗) (C.32)= max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ2 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2.
Therefore, the proof is complete.
Proof of the ⇐ direction:
Suppose that for (G∗,D∗) the following holds for every G ∈ G and D ∈ D:
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,D∗) ≤ max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ2 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2. (C.33)
We claim that V (G∗,D∗) = V proxλ (G∗,D∗). To show this claim, consider the definition of the
λ-proximal equilibrium:
V proxλ (G∗,D∗) ∶= max
D˜∈D V (G∗, D˜) − λ2 ∥D∗ − D˜∥. (C.34)
Here D∗ maximizes the objective because we have assumed that V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,D∗) holds for
every D ∈ D. Therefore, the claim is valid and V (G∗,D∗) = V proxλ (G∗,D∗).
Also, note that for every D the solution D˜ in the proximal optimization satisfies V proxλ (G∗,D) ≤
V (G∗, D˜). Combining these results with (C.33), we obtain the following inequalities which hold
for every G ∈ G and D ∈ D:
V proxλ (G∗,D) ≤ V proxλ (G∗,D∗) ≤ V proxλ (G,D∗). (C.35)
The above equation shows that the pair (G∗,D∗) is a λ-proximal equilibrium.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a λ2-proximal equilibrium (G∗,D∗). As a result of Proposition 2, for every G ∈ G and
D ∈ D we have
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,D∗) ≤ max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ22 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2.
Since λ1 ≤ λ2, the following holds
max
D̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ22 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2 ≤ maxD̃∈D V (G, D̃) − λ12 ∥D̃ −D∗∥2,
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which shows that
V (G∗,D) ≤ V (G∗,D∗) ≤ max
D̃
V (G, D̃) − λ1
2
∥D̃ −D∗∥2.
Due to Proposition 2, (G∗,D∗) will be a λ1-proximal equilibrium as well. Hence, the proof is
complete and we have
PEλ2(V ) ⊆ PEλ1(V ). (C.36)
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the definition of a λ-proximal equilibrium in the parameterized space:
V proxλ (Gθ,Dw) ∶= maxw̃ V (Gθ,Dw̃) − λ2 ∥Dw̃ −Dw∥2. (C.37)
In the above optimization problem, the first term V (Gθ,Dw̃) is assumed to be η2-smooth in w̃,
while the second term λ2 ∥Dw̃ −Dw∥2 will be λ2η1-strongly convex in w̃. As a result, the sum of
the two terms will be (λη12 − η2)-strongly concave if η2 < λη12 holds. Since the objective function
is strongly-concave in w̃, it will be maximized by a unique solution w∗. Moreover, applying the
Danskin’s theorem [50] implies that the following holds at the optimal w∗:
∇θV proxλ (Gθ,Dw) = ∇θV (Gθ,Dw∗). (C.38)
C.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 2. Suppose that f is a γ-strongly convex function according to norm ∥ ⋅ ∥, i.e. for any
x, y ∈ dom(f) and λ ∈ [0,1] we have
f(λx + (1 − λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1 − λ)f(y) − γλ(1 − λ)
2
∥x − y∥2. (C.39)
Consider the following optimization problem where the feasible set X is a convex set and x∗ is the
optimal solution,
min
x∈X f(x). (C.40)
Then, for every x ∈ X we have
f(x) − f(x∗) ≥ γ
2
∥x − x∗∥2. (C.41)
Proof. If we apply the strong-convexity definition (C.39) to x ∈ X , x∗ we obtain
f(λx + (1 − λ)x∗) ≤ λf(x) + (1 − λ)f(x∗) − γλ(1 − λ)
2
∥x − x∗∥2. (C.42)
The above inequality results in
f(λx + (1 − λ)x∗) − f(x∗) ≤ λ(f(x) − f(x∗)) − γλ(1 − λ)
2
∥x − x∗∥2. (C.43)
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Note that X is assumed to be a convex set and therefore λx + (1 − λ)x∗ ∈ X implying f(x∗) ≤
f(λx + (1 − λ)x∗). As a result, for every 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
γλ(1 − λ)
2
∥x − x∗∥2 ≤ λ(f(x) − f(x∗)). (C.44)
Thus for every 0 < λ ≤ 1 we have
γ(1 − λ)
2
∥x − x∗∥2 ≤ f(x) − f(x∗), (C.45)
which proves that γ2 ∥x − x∗∥2 ≤ f(x) − f(x∗) and completes Lemma 2’s proof.
Based on Proposition 2 and the definition of Dθ, we only need to show that for the W2GAN’s
objective, which we denote by V (G,D), the following holds for every θ:
V (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) ≤ max
D∈D V (Gθ,D) − 12η ∥D −Dθ∗∥2H˙1 . (C.46)
To show the above inequality, it suffices to prove the following inequality
V (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) ≤ V (Gθ,Dθ) − 1
2η
∥Dθ −Dθ∗∥2
H˙1
. (C.47)
Claim: For the W2GAN problem, we have
V (Gθ,Dθ) = 1
2η
E[∥∇Dθ(X)∥22].
To show this claim, note that according to the W2GAN’s formulation we have V (Gθ,Dθ) ∶=
Wc(PX, PGθ(Z)) where c(x,x′) = η2∥x − x′∥22 is the second-order cost function specified in the theo-
rem. We start by proving this result for η = 1. In this case, the Brenier theorem [51] proves that
the optimal transport map from the data variable X to the generative model Gθ(Z) can be derived
from the gradient of the optimal Dθ as follows
ψopt(x) = x −∇Dθ(x). (C.48)
which plugged into the optimal transport objective Wc(P,Q) ∶= infΠ(P,Q) E[c(X,X′)] proves that
V (Gθ,Dθ) ∶=Wc(PX, PGθ(Z)) = E[12∥∇Dθ(X)∥22].
The above equation proves the result holds for η = 1. For a general η > 0, note that applying a
simple change of variable in the Kantorovich duality representation and solving the dual problem
for D˜(x) = ηD(x) shows that ψopt(x) = x − 1η∇D˜θ(x) transport samples from the data domain
to the generative model. This is due to the fact that after applying this change of variable the
Kantorovich duality reduces to η multiplied to the dual problem for η = 1. As a result, applying
the transport map to the definition of the optimal transport cost shows that
V (Gθ,Dθ) ∶=Wc(PX, PGθ(Z)) = 12ηE[∥∇Dθ(X)∥22],
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proving the claim holds for any η > 0.
Substituting the discriminator maximization with the result in the above claim, the W2GAN
problem reduces to the following problem:
min
θ
1
2η
E[∥∇Dθ(X)∥2
2
]. (C.49)
Here we can equivalently optimize for Dθ ∈ {Dθ ∶ θ ∈ Θ} instead of minimizing over the variable θ,
obtaining
min
Dθ
1
2η
E[∥∇Dθ(X)∥2
2
]. (C.50)
Note that the term 12E[∥∇Dθ(X)∥22] = 12∥Dθ∥2H˙1 reduces to the squared of the defined Sobolev
norm in a semi-Hilbert space, which results in a 1-strongly convex function according to ∥ ⋅ ∥H˙1
with strong convexity defined as in (C.39). As a result, the objective in (C.50) is 1η -strongly convex
according to the Sobolev norm ∥ ⋅∥H˙1 . In addition, this objective is minimized over a convex feasible
set {Dθ ∶ θ ∈ Θ}, due to the theorem’s assumption. Therefore, Lemma 2 shows that the optimal
Dθ
∗
satisfies the following inequality for every θ:
1
2η
E[∥∇Dθ(X)∥2
2
] − 1
2η
E[∥∇Dθ∗(X)∥2
2
] ≥ 1
2η
∥Dθ −Dθ∗∥2
H˙1
.
The above result implies that
V (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) ≤ V (Gθ,Dθ) − 1
2η
∥Dθ −Dθ∗∥2
H˙1
, (C.51)
which completes the proof.
C.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 3. Consider two vectors x,y with equal Euclidean norms ∥x∥2 = ∥y∥2. Then for every
0 ≤ a ≤ b, we have
a∥x − y∥2 ≤ ∥ax − by∥2. (C.52)
Proof. Note that
∥ax − by∥22 − a2∥x − y∥22 = (b2 − a2)∥y∥22 − 2a(b − a)xTy= (b − a)((b + a)∥y∥22 − 2axTy)≥ 0.
The above holds as we have assumed that 0 ≤ a ≤ b implying 0 ≤ 2a ≤ b+a and since the two vectors
x,y share the same Euclidean norm
∣xTy∣ ≤ ∥x∥22 + ∥y∥22
2
= ∥y∥22.
Hence, Lemma 3’s proof is complete.
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As shown by the Kantorovich duality [49], for the optimal Dθ and the optimal coupling
piθ(PX, PGθ(Z)) the following holds with probability 1 for every joint sample (X,X′) drawn from
the optimal coupling piθ,
Dθ(X) −Dθ(X′) = ∥X −X′∥2. (C.53)
Knowing that Dθ is 1-Lipschitz, for every convex combination βX + (1 − β)X′ we must have
∇Dθ(βX + (1 − β)X′) = X −X′∥X −X′∥ .
This will imply that there definitely exists αθ such that the transport map described in the theorem
maps the data distribution to the generative model. Plugging this transport map into the definition
of the first-order Wasserstein distance, we obtain
V (Gθ,Dθ) ∶ =W1(PX, PGθ(Z))= E[∥α2θ(X)∇Dθ(X)∥2]= E[∥αθ(X)∇Dθ(X)∥22]
where the last equality holds since the Euclidean norm of ∇Dθ(X) has a unit Euclidean norm with
probability 1 over the data distribution PX as we proved ∇Dθ(βX + (1 − β)X′) = X−X′∥X−X′∥ holds for
every 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 including β = 1.
As a result, the Wasserstein GAN problem reduces to the following optimization problem
min
θ
E[∥αθ(X)∇Dθ(X)∥22] (C.54)
Defining hθ(X) ∶= αθ(X)∇Dθ(X), 12E[∥hθ(X)∥22] is 1-strongly convex with respect to the norm
function ∥h∥H˙0 = √E[h2(X) ]
that is induced by the following inner product and results in a Hilbert space⟨D1,D2⟩H˙0 ∶= EPX[D1(X)D2(X)].
Therefore, for the θ∗ minimizing the objective in (C.54) over the assumed convex set {hθ ∶ θ ∈ Θ},
Lemma 2 implies that
E[∥αθ(X)∇Dθ(X)∥22] − E[∥αθ∗(X)∇Dθ∗(X)∥22] = E[∥hθ(X)∥22] − E[∥hθ∗(X)∥22]≥ ∥hθ − hθ∗∥2H˙0= E[∥hθ(X) − hθ∗(X)∥22]= E[∥αθ(X)∇Dθ(X) − αθ∗(X)∇Dθ∗(X)∥22]≥ η
2
E[∥∇Dθ(X) −∇Dθ∗(X)∥22]= η
2
∥Dθ −Dθ∗∥2H˙1 .
Here the last inequality follows from Lemma 3 since every Dθ has a unit-norm gradient with
probability 1 according to the data distribution PX. Therefore, we have proved that
V (Gθ,Dθ) − V (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) ≥ η
2
∥Dθ −Dθ∗∥2H˙1 . (C.55)
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The above inequality results in the following for every feasible θ
V (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) ≤ max
D∈D V (Gθ,D) − η2∥D −Dθ∗∥2H˙1 . (C.56)
Hence, according to Proposition 2, we have shown that the pair (Gθ∗ ,Dθ∗) is an η-proximal equi-
librium with respect to the Sobolev norm ∥ ⋅ ∥H˙1 .
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